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Recent Uzbek historiography relies heavily on the hypothesis that






peoplesand theoutcomesof theeventshadfar&reachingconsequences.2 In





context of conflicts between local groups competing for power. More
specifically, the case studywill describe how aTashkentmufti planned to
win Turkestan’s independence from Soviet power, where the Basmachi
appearedaspossiblemilitaryprotagonists.
During archival research in Tashkent we found two unpublished
documentswritten in turki and addressed to the JapaneseConsul inQulja
and the British Consul assigned to Kashghar. These two documents were
found in thefile theOGPUopenedonSadreddin&KhanSharifkhwajaev3 in
1921, which is conserved in the National Security Service Archive of








these two letters by comparing themwith other documents from the same
archiveassucha“reconstruction”isneededifwearetoshedlightontheir
origin.Thepaperthengoesontopresentthedatacollectedonthelifeofthe
author of the letters, and subsequently offers an interpretation of their






progress. The Turkic and Muslim nations, being oppressed by a Russian
nationalisticpolicyofRussification, lostallof theirpolitical rightsandspent their
lives under tyranny.During this time, the Turkestani people, dissatisfied with the





head of the Soviet government, promised freedom to every nation, especially to
those in theEast.On thisbasis,wishing to restorenational liberties, in thecityof
Kokand,theformercapitalofTurkestan,theautonomyoftheregionwasdeclared.
The Turks of Turkestan set up a moderate government but the nationalistic
Bolsheviksdestroyedthecitieswithdespoticaggressionandunrestrainedviolence,
spilling blood, killing women and children, ransacking houses and seizing our
property.Thegovernment representativeswere shotandhungand thegovernment
dissolved.Arsonandmurderarestilltakingplace.
Aftertheeliminationofthegovernment,allauthorityinKokandpassedto
the Committee of Turkestan National Independence. The army of the previous
governmentofKokandcamealsounderthecontroloftheCommittee.InFerghana,
thenationalarmedforceshavecontinued to fightwithpatienceanddetermination.
Its associations have been set up in every region and its members are secretly
workingtofurthertheidealsofnationhood.
At the same time, theBukharan andKhivan khanates have also suffered
greatly. Therefore, the Central Committees of the National Union of Turkestan,
BukharaandKhivarequestthat,inthenameofbrotherhoodandpatriotism,themost
honourable government of Japan,which holds dear the slogan ‘Asia forAsians!’,








The Commander in Chief of the National Army of Ferghana,
Shirmuhammadbek











all. After the events ofOctober 1917, themanifesto of Lenin, head of the Soviet
government,promisedfreedomtoeverynation,especially tothoseintheEast.On
thisbasis, inthecityofKokand,theancientcapitalofTurkestan, theautonomyof
the region was declared. A just government, conguous with the morality of the
nationslivinginTurkestan,wassetup.When,inordertocelebratethisevent,allthe
nations proclaimed public celebrations, the Bolsheviks destroyed the cities with
despotic aggression and unrestrained violence, spilling blood, killing women and
children, ransacking houses and seizing our property. The government
representatives were shot and hung and the government dissolved. Arson and
murderarestilltakingplace.
Aftertheeliminationofthegovernment,allauthorityinKokandpassedto
the Committee of Turkestan National Independence. The army of the previous
government ofKokand also cameunder the control of theCommittee.Until now,
the armed forces have continued to fight in Ferghana with patience and
determination.
At the same time, the Bukharan and Khivan khanates have also been
destroyed and have suffered greatly. Therefore, the Committees of the National









The Commander in Chief of the National Army of Ferghana,
Shirmuhammadbek















“The representativesof theUnitedCommittee for theNationalLiberation
of Central Asia, in the persons of Sadriddin&Khan,Kerimov and others, made an
appealtotheBritishConsulatKuldjain1921askingforthesupportoftheBritish
Government. This constitutes one of the characteristic episodes in the struggle of
Turkestan against Soviet power. The appeal never reached its destination. The
specialmessengeronhiswaytoKuldjawasarrestedbytheBolsheviksinthetown
ofAulie&Ata.As a result, all themembersof the ‘CommitteeofLiberation’were
condemned.”7

In a work published in Istanbul in 1945, Abdullah Rajab Baysuni
referstopossessingSadreddin&Khan’smemoirs.Inanexcerpthesays:

“I knew that, theCentralCommittee [of theorganization],which in1920





However, it was not only the Turkestani diaspora that related the
existenceofthetwomessages.Explicitreferencesaremadetothemintwo
studiespublishedbyBabakhwajaevinthe1950s.Bothgivemanyelements
that coincide with the information that was collected from archive
documents, and which will be presented shortly. The historical
interpretationsregardingthesetwomessagesdo,however,differ.Inthefirst
study,Babakhwajaevattributesthewritingofthesetwoletterstoa“counter&
revolutionary organization called the Central Committee of the Turkestan
NationalUnion,whichwas led by the fierce pan&Turkist and pan&Islamist
MuftiSadreddin&KhwajaSharifkhwajaev”.AccordingtoBabakhwajaev,this
organization was directly linked to the British and Japanese Consuls in
Qulja, who were believed to have financed the Committee in order to
organizeandarmBasmachigroups.9InhissecondstudyBabakhwajaevalso
attributes thewritingof the letters to theCommittee, butpresents themas
proof of a larger anti&Soviet subversive intent. Indeed he sustained that
Enver Pasha had given orders to the “ittihadists”10 to assemble all their
forcesinTurkestan.AccordingtotheUzbekscholarthecreationofa“pan&
Turkist nationalistic organization called the “Central Committee of the
Turkestan National Union” in February 1921 was one of Enver Pasha’s
machinations.11
The case of the two letterswas subsequently described byAripov
andMilshtein ingreaterdetail.This studyhighlights the roleof theCheka
P.Sartori
 122
agent Shukur Muhamedov, who infiltrated the counter&revolutionary
organizationMilliIttihad(NationalUnion),andinterceptedthetwolettersin
Aulie&Ata.12





“Two young messangers, Yusufbek Qurbanov and Rustam Niyazbekov,
togetherwithArifKarimov,were sent by theBukharan sectionofMilli Ittihad to
Tashkent, where they were entrusted with a message by Sadreddin&Khan
SharifkhwajaevandtooktheroadtoKashghar.Theyhadbeeninstructedtoconsign
aletterwritteninthenameofthegovernmentsofBukhara,KhorezmandTurkestan







Given that Sirajiddin Ahmedov’s reconstruction bears no critical
apparatus,itwouldbelegitimatetoconcludethatmostoftheinformationhe
usedcamefromMunawwar&Qari’smemoirs.
At this point, a further contribution to the study of the writing of
these letters can be given by comparing the documents and the memoirs
collected during archival research, in particular, by consulting the dossiers




re&examined the list of accusations brought against a group of Tashkent
‘ulama16, a note (obzornaya spravka) summarises the affair relating to the
twoletters:

“― Sharifkhwajaev Sadreddin Khwaja, born in 1878, from Tashkent, a
teacherbeforehisarrest;
― Karimov Garif Alminovich, born in 1889, from Orenburg, he was
employedbyaneducationalinstituteinTashkentbeforehisarrest;
― Kurbanov Yusufbek, born in 1899, from Tashkent, head of a rate&
regulationcommission;
― Umarov Muhamedyar Muhamedovich, born in 1899, from Tashkent,
teacheratschool№13inTashkentbeforehisarrest;






― Sharifkhwajaev, Karimov, Kurbanov, Umarov, and Niyazbekov were
arrestedin1921bytheTurchekaPolitsektor,asmembersofacounter&revolutionary
group that on 9 March 1921 during an illegal meeting prepared two counter&
revolutionary and inflammatory letters addressed to representatives of Japan and
GreatBritain,requestingarmsandmoneyonbehalfoftheCommitteeof‘National
Union’ (Milli Ittihad) to support them in their fight against Soviet power in
Turkestan.
Having authenticated the above&mentioned letters with the seal of the
organization Milli Ittihad, Karimov and Kurbanov, on the request of
Sharifkhwajaev,setoffforAulie&AtainordertoillegallycrossthebordertoChina
withtheintentionofconsigningthesemessagestotherepresentativesofJapanand
Great Britain. Karimov and Kurbanov were also supplied with reports from the
People’sCommissariat forEducation [whichwould have insured them] a journey
without obstacles to the city of Aulie&Ata. The documents were prepared by
Sharifkhwajaev.
KarimovandKurbanovwereheldinthecityofAulie&AtabytheChekaand





the fact that the file contained concrete proof refused to plead guilty. On 23
December 1921 the Supreme Revolutionary Court of the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet Republic of Turkestan examined the case publicly and
issuedthefollowingsentences:
Sharifkhwajaev, Karimov and Ziya&Muhamedov condemned to execution
by firing squad. Kurbanov condemned to 3 years’ hard labour, Umarov and
Niyazbekov condemned to 2 years’ hard labour% However, on the basis of the
amnesty granted by the TurkTsIK on 7 November 1921 for Sharifkhwajaev and
Karimov execution by firing squad was commuted to 5 years’ hard labour, for




















it seems clear that the initiative for the writing of the two letters can be
firmlyattributedtoSadreddin&KhanSharifkhwajaev.Inaddition,Kutsenko’s




An extract from Munawwar&Qari’s memoirs written in prison in
1931 is furtherevidenceof theunreliabilityof the signatures, andsustains










Given theunreliablenatureof the signatures,weshouldattempt to
understand towhat extentSadreddin&Khan’swordsonplans forTurkestan
independence actually had a basis in fact. In order to do so, we need to




20 December 1929 Munawwar&Qari relates that he had received a letter
during his stay in Bukhara. This letter informed him that in Tashkent an
organization called Milli Ittihad had been set up, replacing the existent
IttihadwaTaraqqi(UnionandProgress).Munawwar&Qarirecallsthatatthe





new organization, and tell himwho themembers of its central committee
were. Munawwar&Qari recounts that Haydar Effendi answered that this
organizationreallydidexistinTashkent,buthedidnotknowwhowasonits
centralcommittee.Heassumed,however, that itwaslikelythatSadreddin&
Khan and Musa Begiev21, who were both members of the former
organizationIttihadwaTaraqqi,wereinvolved.Munawwar&Qarisays that,
at that point, in Bukhara the question was raised as to whether theMilli
IttihadCentralCommitteeshouldbemovedfromTashkent,orwhetherthe
fellow members of the organization who stayed in Bukhara should put
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themselves under the control of the Tashkent group. The transfer was
decidedupon:onlyaprovincialsectionoftheorganizationwastobeleftin
Tashkent.Munawwar&Qari reports thathe informedSadreddin&Khanof the
decisionandaskedhimtocarryouttheorderandsendthestatuteandsealof
the organization to Bukhara. No answer to the request arrived, and the
Central Committee in Bukhara never received what it had asked for.
Munawwar&Qari recounts that the climate created encouraged a current of
distrust of theTashkent groupwithin theMilli Ittihad CentralCommittee,
which had in themeantimemoved toBukhara,where itmet two or three
timestodecideuponastatuteandaprogrammefortheorganization.




“At the time relationships between Bukhara and Tashkent were tense.
Those from Bukhara operated under the flag of [the organization for] the
IndependenceofBukharawhiletheTurkestanisunderthatoftheNationalUnion;at




stayed therefrom7th to20thMarch1921,and thatduringhisstayhemet
the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, who
entrusted him with a position on the scientific council of the People’s
CommissariatforEducation(Narkompros).Threeorfourdaysafterhaving
arrived in Tashkent he remembers meeting Musa Bigiev and Sadreddin&
Khan.
Munawwar&Qari claims he asked Sadreddin&Khanwhy he had not
sent thesealandthestatuteoftheorganizationtoBukhara.Herelatesthat
Sadreddin&Khan defended himself saying that hewas not in possession of
eitherthesealorthestatute,thathehadgiventhemtosomeoneelse,andit
wasforthisreasonhehadbeenunabletosendthem.Afterthis,Sadreddin&
Khan supposedly looked at Musa Bigiev and smiled, which seemed
suspicioustoMunawwar&Qari.
Munawwar&Qari also claimed that he advised Sadreddin&Khan to
findthesealandthestatuteandsendthemtoBukhara,addingthatTashkent






Qurbanov and Karimov a month and a half later. This extract from the
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Munawwar&Qari rememberswith surprising accuracy the trial date







nation (millat) in the struggle for the independence from Soviet power.
Those who went to Bukhara did not wish to place themselves under the
authority claimedby the representatives of theMilli Ittihad andwished to
runtheCentralCommitteeoftheorganizationthemselves.










its most prominent members: Sagdullah Khwaja Tursun Khajaev, Atakhan Nazir
Khwajaev,Munawwar&QariAbdurashidovandothers.”25





We believe that Tillahanov’s notes provide substantially new
elementsaboutthestructureoftheMilliIttihadorganization.Inparticularhe
explains the reorganization of the roles and duties expected of those who




consisted of: 1. Sadreddin&Khan Sharifkhwajaev (President); 2. Najmetdin Shir





The members of the Syr&Daria committee of the organization had the following
duties: President – Sadreddin&Khan; Secretary – Selim&Khan Tillakhanov; foreign
affairs – Najmetdin Shirahmetbaev; information exchange and internal affairs –
Talibjan Musabaev; military affairs – Israiljan Ibragimov; Treasurer – Karimbek
Narbekov;organizer–AbdullahjanZiyabaev.InthevastmajorityofcasestheSyr&
Daria committee did not act alone but took decisions based on the orders of the
Bukharancentre.At thesametime,however,Sadreddin&KhanSharifkhwajaevwas
given full powerby the centre andwas considered a representativeof theCentral
CommitteeoftheorganizationwithintheSyr&Dariaoblast.ThisiswhySadreddin&
Khan sometimes acted alone without waiting for the centre to answer to resolve
somequestions.”27

The establishment of the Syr&Daria oblast committee by theMilli
Ittihad organization placed Sadreddin&Khan in a position of formal
dependence.Inturnthisprovidedhimwitheffectiveindependencefromthe
centreoftheorganizationsituatedinBukhara.Takingtheinitiativetowrite









those who (after the disbanding of the Ittihad wa Taraqqi) moved from
TashkenttoBukhara.
ItsislikelythatastrugglefortheauthorityovertheMuslimpolitical
factions which remained outside Party cadres was taking place. Further
supporttosuchahypothesisisgivenbythefactthatbetweenMayandJune
of1920theactivitiesofTurarRyskulovandtheMusbyuroweresuspended
by Lenin and the Turkkomissiya28. Sadreddin&Khan, therefore, lacked the







Muslim communities in terms of power relations. Life in Muslim groups
workingwithinSovietinstitutionswasconditionedbynewvalues,different
fromthosetypicalofIslamictradition.AtthelevelofSoviet institutions,a




sayyid or a khwaja. Thus, the authority which a Muslim needed to be a
leader, whether of the Musbyuro or of an illegal political organization,
depended on access to instruments of power. Just as for Ryskulov what
provedcrucialtoimplementhispoliticalplanswastheobtainingMoscow’s
favour, so too Sadreddin&Khan needed to demonstrate he could gain the





this mufti.29 Although, the novel is, of course, an unreliable source for
reconstructinghisbiography,itis,however,interestingtonotethatitrelates
thatthemuftidecidedtocontacttheBritishConsulinKashgharbecauseof
his close relationship with the famous British spy Frederick M. Bailey30.





In this year Sadreddin&Khan was distanced, together with
Khairiddin&Khan, from the Society of ‘ulama (‘Ulama Jam‘iyyati) in
Tashkent31, after which Sadreddin&Khan and Khairiddin&Khan established
theSocietyofJurists (FuqahaJam‘iyyati)32.Thiswasanorganization that
wassetupon15August1917byfourqazis,andsomemuftisinTashkent.It
dedicated itself to ifta, i.e. issuing non&binding judgements (fatwa) on
questionsof law. It offered itself to theTashkentMuslimcommunity as a
consultancyorganization,whichcouldbeusedtoobtainjudgementsonlegal
matters(shar‘imas’alalar).Italsosetitselfupastheonlyinstitutionwhich




thisorganizationhadan important legalandpoliticalmeaning.On theone
hand, the Society of Jurists presented itself as an institution that was
congruouswithIslamic tradition.Furtherstill,by linking itself tothework
of the four qazis, the Fuqaha Jam‘iyyati could delegitimise the legal
authorityofthe‘UlamaJam‘iyyatiintheeyesoftheMuslimcommunityin
Tashkent. This hypothesis would therefore explain the intolerance of the















certainly favoured the adoption of ideas on nation (millat) and patriotism
(watan muhabbati). The defence of Islamic ethics (akhlaq) and Arabic
meshed together in Sadreddin&Khan with the exhortation to learn other
peoples’ languages. Being openly critical of the quarrels among Muslim
scholars37,Sadreddin&Khanwasa strongsupporterofvalues suchasunion
and concord (Ittihad wa Ittifaq) in the Muslim community of Turkestan.
EvenifheconsideredassociationisminTashkentin1917inapositivelight,
he warned against the political divisions brought about by the February
Revolution.









Milli Ittihad. He was a member of the People’s Assembly of Turkestan,
whichwas part of theAutonomousGovernment ofKokand,39 and hewas
among thosewho signed the programme of theTurkic Federalist Party in
1917.40
Welose sightofourmufti after theeditorialofficesof theFuqaha
Jam‘iyyati press organwere confiscated.The confiscationwas ordered by
Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev,41 head of the Commissariat for Nationality
Affairs of Turkestan. The periodical was accused of promoting bourgeois
endsandofbeinginconflictwiththeinterestsoftheproletariat.42
Yet, the relationship between Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev and the
Fuqaha Jam‛iyyati pre&dated the issuing of the decreewhich closed down
theperiodicalIzharal*Haqq.Firstofall,weknowthatSadreddin&Khanand
Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev knew each other, given that both had been








socialisation of land was incompatible with the shari‘a. Tashkhwaja
Ashurkhwajaev was also a member of the recently founded Communist
Party of Turkestan.47 This is known to have included many prominent
Muslimswhohoped thatbyparticipating inBolshevikpolitics theywould
accede to the government of the state.48 Certainly, the career of such
MuslimswithintheBolshevikinstitutionsshouldnotmerelybeexplainedby
highlighting their political ability and shrewdness. Indeed, a recent study
puts forward the hypothesis that the enthusiasm of some of these figures
playedavitalroleintheestablishmentoftheCommunistPartyinTurkestan.
Koran in hand, many of them truly believed that socialism could be
reconciledwithIslam.49
At any rate, Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev was a Muslim of
considerable standing who was undoubtedly well known in Soviet
administrativecircles.Wealsoknowthat itwashewhoissuedthedecrees
which led to theclosingofall thenewspapersandmagazinesmanagedby





theMuslimcommunity inTashkent in thesummerof1918.After theRed
Guards destroyed the Autonomous Government of Kokand, in Tashkent
thoseMuslims who were involved in the new regime achieved important
status.52 Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev, newly appointed Commissar for
NationalityAffairs,wasoneofthem.OtherMuslimorganizationscontinued
only temporarily.They operated outside Soviet institutions and sometimes
were forced to adopt positions that were in contrast with the Bolsheviks’
policies.Muslimorganizationssoonbecamepowerlessinthisarena.Indeed,
theSocietyof‛ulama(‛UlamaJam‘iyyati)wasclosedbyadecreesignedby
Kolesov, Head of the Sovnarkom, and Ashurkhwajaev.53 Similarly the
FuqahaJam‘iyyatidissolved,afterthedecreethatsuspendedthepublication
ofitsjournal.54
The plan of the ‛Ulama and Fuqaha Jam‘iyyati to mobilize the
TahskentMuslimcommunity,viaacallformaslaha(“welfare”),provedto
be a failure as the fact that theSovnarkom in Tashkent had the power to
disbandthemhadnotbeentakenintoaccount.









In the argumentation put forward by the mufti in favour of the
independence of Turkestan, the term hurriyyat (freedom) plays a
fundamentalrole.Itsexplicitusesuggestsacloseanalogywiththethemesof
theTashkentMuslimpress.Indeed,withinthisvastliterarycorpusthe1917
February Revolution and the establishment of the Kerenski Provisional
Governmentwerepresentedasthepoliticalchangesthathadmadepossiblea
freepoliticalandculturalclimatefortheTurkestaniMuslims.55
In the document addressed to the Japanese Consul, the term
hurriyyatfollowstherepeateduseofthetermzulm(tyranny)todescribethe
Tsarist government. In this regard, the political interpretation of the term
hurriyyat,whichsuggetstheideaoffreedominoppositiontothatoftyranny,
echoes its first use inOttoman literature.56 Ifwe limit ourselvesmerely to
comparisons,itcanbeobservedthatinboththedocuments,theAutonomous
GovernmentofKokandisseenasmu‘tadil,“just”,atermwhichharksback
to the Islamic ideal of i‘tidal, “justice”, which also inspired Ottoman
intellectuals to reform the political system on constitutional and liberal
principles.57Moreover,theexistenceoftheillegalorganizationcalledIttihad





offers an interpretation (albeit one that is somewhat forced) of the 1916
uprising.Thisreadsasifithadbeenconceivedindefenceofthelegalstatus
oftheTurkestaniMuslims,assubjectsoftheRussianEmpire.Inthissense,
the term huquq refers to a legal concept of citizenship that became
increasinglywidespreadamongtheMuslimcommunitiesoftheEmpirefrom








Theuseoftermssuchas“nation”and“nationality” is, instead, the
most striking difference. In the letter addressed to the Japanese Consul,





that the sentence “theTurkic andMuslim nations of Turkestan” betrays a
prior idea of regional communalism inwhichTurkicness andMuslimness
were meshed together.62 In the letter addressed to the British Consul
religious and ethnic references disappear to be replaced by an image of
Turkestan as a multi&national area, and of the Autonomous Government
installedinKokandasaguarantoroftherightsofallofpeopleslivinginthe
region.
All of the above points to the fact that Sadreddin&Khan was
consciousthattheideasofnationalandcivilrightswouldmakehismessages
persuasive. It isnotbychance that inthe letter totheJapaneseConsul the
ideas of Turkic ethnic identity of the Turkestani nation were prominent,
given that these served as supporting argumentation for the idea ofAsian
brotherhoodwith the Japanese.Nor should the insistence on the theme of
rights and the absence of jingoistic elements in the letter to the British
surpriseus,astheywereseenasdefendersofcivilrightsandcivilisation.
Aspreviouslynoted, thesignaturesat thebottomofthedocuments
are false. It is, however, worth mentioning that Shirmuhammadbek
(otherwiseknownasKurShirmat)andhisarmedgroupswerepresentedas




In reconstructing themufti’s political project the most significant
factors that the letters offer are the idea of regional independence from
Soviet power and the almost total absence of references to Islamic
institutions.Sadreddin&Khansustainedthatthe“power”oftheAutonomous
Government of Turkestan,which had been proclaimed inNovember 1917
and dissolved by the Bolsheviks in March 1918, was transferred to the

















Sadreddin&Khan probably thought it too risky to highlightMuslim
communalism.CertainlyinthenotsodistantpasttheRussianshadmistaken
thattypeofreligiouscommunalismasaclearsignof“pan&Islamism”63and
Islamophobia had supplied the Tsarist administration with an excuse for
carrying out restrictive policies against the Turkestani Muslims.64 At the
beginningofthe1920s,itisprobablethatitwasconsiderationssuchasthese
that convinced thisTashkentmufti to almost entirely cover up the Islamic
identityofSovietTurkestan.
Indeed,inbothoftheletterstheauthorrepeatsthephrase“afterthe
elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the
CommitteeofTurkestanNational Independence”.Rather thanportrayinga
conflict between Muslims and Bolsheviks, by employing such a phrase
Sadreddin&Khanwishedtoappearasapoliticalrepresentativeonaparwith
hisaudiences(theJapaneseandBritishConsuls),whenrequestingfinancial
assistance for resistance against the Soviets and in favour of Turkestan
independence.
If such an initiative came out of an environmentwhichwished to
defendtheintegrityofIslamicinstitutions,itshouldalsobehighlightedthat
the plan of the Tashkentmufti responded to precise political needs. The
rhetorical elements which record a careful evaluation of the international
circumstancesinwhichTurkestanthenfounditselfshouldbereadinsucha
light. Moreover, the history of the letters suggests that Sadreddin&Khan’s
initiative should be seen a a way to obtain authority over the “counter&
revolutionary” organizations in action in Turkestan and in the People’s
Republic of Bukhara. The struggle between coalitions of Muslim
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